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The question of whether ethnic diversity aﬀects economic
performances has recently become a very active research area
in a number of disciplines, including economics, development
studies, management, and political science (see e.g., Alesina &
La Ferrara, 2005; Go¨ren, 2014; Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007;
Posner, 2004). At the same time, research on the migration-
development nexus has grown steadily, after many years of
neglect, in particular within development studies (De Haan,
1999). In fact, the ﬁeld has rapidly expanded in scope, emerg-
ing as a proper subﬁeld (Clemens, O¨zden, & Rapoport, 2014).
In this article we investigate the extent to which cultural diver-
sity aﬀects economic growth, using novel data on bilateral
migration stocks, that is the number of people living and
working outside the countries of their birth, to compute
indices of heterogeneity. In so doing, we explore the eﬀect of
immigration on development through its eﬀect on the compo-
sition of the destination country.
Whether cultural diversity—the range of citizens with diﬀer-
ent origins, religions, and traditions living and interacting
together—carries economic costs (e.g., Easterly & Levine,
1997) or beneﬁts (e.g., Ottaviano & Peri, 2006) is a highly dis-
puted question among scholars. Horwitz and Horwitz (2007,
p. 988) eloquently describe diversity as a ‘‘double-edged
sword”. A rich pool of diﬀerent expertise and experiences
can potentially create organizational synergies, and hence pos-
itive team outcome. Yet heterogeneous environments may also
give rise to coordination problems (for instance due to lan-
guage diversity or lack of trust), thus increasing transaction
costs and creating irreconcilable divisions.
Our contribution to this debate is twofold. Firstly, most of
the existing studies are cross-sectional and explore the eﬀect
of ethnic and linguistic diversity on economic growth using
time-invariant measures based on language and ethnicity
(e.g., Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg,
2003; Go¨ren, 2014; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a). 1 This
is unfortunate since the racial and ethnic composition of mod-
ern societies have dramatically changed in the last few decades
as a consequence of mass migration. During 1960–2000 the227global migrant stock moved from 92 million to 165 million
(O¨zden, Parsons, Schiﬀ, & Walmsley, 2011), and continued
to grow rapidly, reaching 222 million in 2010 (UNDESA.,
2016). If anything, the very eﬀect of cultural heterogeneity is
likely to diﬀer over time. Furthermore, as Horowitz (1985)
laments, interpreting ethnicity as connected only to language
or race is too narrow; he instead argues that connection to birth
should be the primary, if not the only, criterion. Similarly, in an
interdisciplinary overview of the meaning of ethnicity and its
social and political consequences, Kanbur, Rajaram, and
Varshney (2011) recall how several identity categories are given
to each of us at the time of birth.
Against this background, this paper uses an almost-
exhaustive dataset on international migration during
1960–2010, and compute diversity by referring to a main iden-
tifying characteristic, the nationality of the immigrants. The
nature of the dataset coupled with our estimation technique
(a variety of two-stage least-squares and panel data models)
allows us to kill three birds with one stone by accounting for
(i) social changes over time, (ii) cross-country variations in
the starting level of development, and (iii) country-speciﬁc
(time-invariant) unobservable characteristics, to avoid attribut-
ing ‘‘more to diversity than is warranted” (Kanbur et al., 2011,
p. 150). In a similar vein, Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport
(2016) ﬁnd that diversity of skilled immigration relates
positively to economic development. 2 To the best of our
knowledge, only a handful of studies investigate the eﬀect of
diversity on growth over time, yet they are mostly
sub-national and draw on U.S. census data (e.g., Ager &
Bru¨ckner, 2013; Ottaviano & Peri, 2006), thus raising concerns
about the external validity of their results.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the existing
cross-country literature pools together low and high-incomeEuropean Commission. Final revision accepted: August 13, 2016.
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diﬀerent role at diﬀerent stages of development. In fact, previ-
ous estimates are unlikely to capture the complexity of the
relationship because they provide an average estimate. Focus-
ing on less-developed countries appears crucial in light of
recently released data on migration: during 1960–2000,
South-South migration dominated global trends and made
up half of all international migration in 2000 (O¨zden et al.,
2011). In 2015 nearly half of all international migrants lived
outside Europe and Northern America (UNDESA, 2016).
Furthermore, a lack of attention to the initial level of develop-
ment of a country is all the more remarkable in light of the
cross-country empirical literature on growth, which reveals
substantial diﬀerences between the aggregate production func-
tions of economies with diﬀerent initial conditions (Durlauf &
Johnson, 1995), a theoretical possibility opened by endoge-
nous growth theories (see e.g., Vandenbussche, Aghion, &
Meghir, 2006). We therefore revisit the empirical relationship
between cultural heterogeneity and growth, and explore
whether this relation depends on the level of development of
a country.
En route, we contribute to addressing endogeneity issues in
the cross-country empirical literature on the eﬀect of diversity
on growth. Positive economic shocks in the destination coun-
try can be a strong pull-factor for immigration, whereas omit-
ted time-varying factors could drive the joint pattern of
immigration and development. If this is the case, estimates
would be biased. To tackle these issues, we use an instrumental
variable approach, and construct a variable whose exogenous
variation aﬀects migration inﬂows in a country, and therefore
its degree of diversity, without aﬀecting its rate of economic
growth. Following previous studies by e.g., Frankel and
Romer (1999), we exploit the dyadic nature of our dataset
on migration to run a gravity model and predict countries’
bilateral migration stocks out of a set of exogenous dyadic
variables which are unlikely to aﬀect economic growth in the
destination country (e.g., geographic distance, contiguity, the
existence of a colonial relationship, or the presence of a com-
mon language). We then use the bilateral predicted immigra-
tion stocks to construct indices of fractionalization and
polarization; ﬁnally, we use these gravity-based predicted
diversity indices as an instrument for the percentage growth
rates of birthplace diversity (fractionalization and polariza-
tion). This approach allows us to isolate the portion of the cor-
relation between diversity and economic growth that is due to
the causal eﬀect of diversity.
Our strategy proves to be sensible, as we detect signiﬁcant
relations between cultural heterogeneity and economic
growth, depending on the time period and the level of develop-
ment of a country. Overall, we ﬁnd that both indices of diver-
sity, fractionalization, and polarization, have a distinct
positive impact on real GDP growth. Moreover, the eﬀect of
diversity seems to be more pronounced and consistent in
developing countries. The most conservative estimates suggest
that an increase of one percentage point in the degree of frac-
tionalization or polarization increases the per capita output by
about 0.1 percentage point in the developing countries,
whereas the eﬀect of diversity in the developed economies is
indiscernible from zero.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical
framework on the relation between migration, cultural diver-
sity, and development. Section 3 brieﬂy explains the diﬀerence
between fractionalization and polarization. Section 4 describes
the dataset and Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Sec-
tion 6 presents our empirical results and Section 7 concludes.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although the relationship between development and migra-
tion has long been regarded as an ‘‘unsettled” issue
(Papademetriou, 1991), and the ‘‘diversity of experiences
described in the literature prohibits generalizations”
(De Haan, 1999, p. 20), a consensus has emerged among schol-
ars and multilateral development agencies that international
migration has a positive eﬀect on the economic welfare of
the receiving countries (see e.g., De Haan, 1999; UNDP,
2009; World Bank, 2009). Immigration can have beneﬁcial
growth eﬀects through a variety of channels, by e.g., improv-
ing the eﬃciency of international resource allocation (see van
der Mensbrugghe & Roland-Holst, 2009); making a positive
ﬁscal contribution (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014); reducing
dependency ratios (Gagnon, 2014); or increasing innovation
and specialization through higher number of patent applica-
tions and grants issued per capita (Chellaraj, Maskus, &
Mattoo, 2008). Skeldon (2008) questions how well-founded
the consensus that migration can be managed so as to promote
development is, and whether it is likely to be a passing phase in
development thinking. Deane, Johnston, and Parkhurst (2013)
suggest a potential clash in perspectives on the beneﬁts of
migration by recalling the role of mobility in the spread of
HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, and how migration can be associ-
ated with diﬀerent risk behaviors.
One of the most important eﬀects that migration has on eco-
nomic development goes through its impact on the level of
heterogeneity of the host country. In fact, migrants increase
the diversity of society (Collier, 2013) and although not all
immigrants are ethnically diﬀerent from the native population,
ethnic heterogeneity in modern society is largely driven by the
mounting wave of immigration (see e.g., Putnam, 2007).
Furthermore, because immigrants have often higher fertility
rates than natives, ethnic diversity is likely to increase in the
years ahead, even in the absence of new migration inﬂows
(Putnam, 2007; Smith & Edmonston, 1997). In this section,
we will explicate in more details the channels through which
immigration-fueled diversity aﬀects economic development.
We also oﬀer a short discussion of the potential diﬀerences
in the eﬀect of diversity on growth between developing and
developed economies.
(a) Diversity and development
Immigrants are carriers of a variety of ideas and abilities,
and are an important factor input into the process of techno-
logical progress. More than their actual number, however,
their composition seems to be crucial issue in stimulating the
rate of technological progress in the destination country. In
fact, a large number of studies, particularly at the micro level,
support the claim that diversity has productivity-enhancing
eﬀects. Diversity within a team may improve its performance,
as workers from diﬀerent backgrounds bring along their vari-
ous skills, experiences, and abilities in the day-to-day interac-
tions. A seminal article by Lazear (1999) shows that diversity
can raise overall productivity in the presence of complemen-
tarity of skills. Hong and Page (2001) discuss how heterogene-
ity improves problem-solving and prove that heterogeneous
groups of people with limited abilities can do better than
homogeneous groups of high-ability problem-solvers.
Empirical studies suggest that heterogeneity, such as the
degree of fractionalization of teams of workers into diﬀerent
nationalities, improves labor productivity, holding average
ability constant, which is consistent with the presence of
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Nickerson, & Owan, 2003; Trax, Brunow, & Suedekum, 2015).
At a more aggregate level, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) ﬁnd
that US-born citizens living in metropolitan areas with higher
share of foreign-born workers experienced a signiﬁcant
increase in their wage and in the rental price, implying that
a more multicultural urban environment makes US-born citi-
zens more productive. Similarly, Ager and Bru¨ckner (2013)
explore the eﬀects of mass immigration to the US during the
1870–1920 period and ﬁnd that whereas increases in the cul-
tural fractionalization of US counties boosted output per cap-
ita, cultural polarization had the opposite eﬀect.
Ager and Bru¨ckner’s (2013) latter ﬁnding is not surprising as
a large empirical literature points out to a negative eﬀect of
racial fragmentation on social cohesion and interpersonal
trust (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Delhey & Newton,
2005). Experimental evidence is consistent with this view and
suggest that people trust people who look like them more than
those who do not (DeBruine, 2002) and racial lines are an
important impediment to trust among individuals (Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). This negative eﬀect
can be mediated by social ties and frequent social interactions
(Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008).
By challenging social solidarity and by eroding the level of
social capital (Putnam, 2007), ethnic diversity is shown to have
a number of undesirable eﬀects on society: (i) diversity, in par-
ticular cultural polarization, can be destabilizing as culturally
fragmented societies are associated with high probability of
conﬂict (see e.g., Esteban & Ray, 2011; Horowitz, 1985;
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a); (ii) diversity may lead
to distortionary taxation, large government sector, or vora-
cious redistribution (Azzimonti, 2011; Lane & Tornell,
1999); (iii) ethnic diversity is negatively correlated to participa-
tion in community activities and to voting in elections at var-
ious levels (Mavridis, 2015); (iv) heterogeneity under various
forms or dimensions may hinder collective actions when e.g.,
individuals of comparatively high ability are induced to exit
a pooling arrangement (Platteau & Seki, 2007) and may make
regulation less eﬃcient (Baland & Platteau, 2003); (v) as ethni-
cally diverse communities are less able to overcome the collec-
tive action problems, cultural diversity can reduce the
willingness to redistribute income and provide (socially) opti-
mal levels of public goods (e.g., Bahry, Kosolapov, Kozyreva,
& Wilson, 2005; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). 3
The above results are echoed in cross-country analyses
where diversity appears to inhibit economic growth. Using a
sample of African countries, Easterly and Levine (1997) ﬁnd
evidence of a negative impact of diversity on economic
growth, and suggest that this can partially explain the poor
economic performances of the continent. Gerring, Thacker,
Lu, and Huang (2015) uncover a positive association of diver-
sity with fertility and mortality rates and a negative relation
with literacy and growth. Go¨ren (2014) suggests that whereas
ethnic diversity has a strong direct negative impact on eco-
nomic growth, ethnic polarization has indirect negative eco-
nomic eﬀects through investment, human capital, instability,
openness, and civil war.
To sum up, cultural diversity aﬀects the propensity of the cit-
izens of one country to trust the citizens of another country, and
thus impairs coordination among actors, increases divergences
in policy preferences, and creates incompatible expectations. At
the same time, a diverse range of societal norms, customs, and
ethics can nurture technological innovation, the diﬀusion of
new ideas, and the production of a greater variety of goods
and services. Through its inﬂuence on technological innovation
and human capital, diversity plays an important role indetermining patterns of economic growth. The net eﬀect is
not clear-cut and needs to be determined from the data.
(b) Does the eﬀect of diversity on growth diﬀer between
developing and developed economies?
The literature on immigration emphasizes that immigrants
represent human resources, particularly appropriate for inno-
vation and technological progress (Bodvarsson & Van den
Berg, 2013); like the eﬀect of education, the level of hetero-
geneity in their composition should enhance human capital
formation and favor the adoption of new technologies
(Nelson & Phelps, 1966). Yet, the impact of human capital
on economic growth is a controversial issue, and the recent
cross-country growth literature convincingly shows that diﬀer-
ent economies obey diﬀerent linear models when grouped
together according to their initial level of economic develop-
ment (see Durlauf & Johnson, 1995; Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, Savvides, & Stengos, 2001). Durlauf and
Johnson (1995) ﬁnd that the secondary enrollment ratio is
one third larger in magnitude for the middle income econo-
mies as compared to the high income. Krueger and Lindahl
(2001) uncover a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of education
on subsequent growth only for less-developed countries, those
with the lowest level of education. Similarly, Qadri and
Waheed (2013) claim that the returns of human capital are
higher in the low-income countries than in the full sample.
A theoretical reason underpinning the above ﬁndings is oﬀered
by Vandenbussche et al. (2006): rich countries are closer to the
technological frontier, thus the strength of the catch-up eﬀect
with the frontier vanishes with the relative level of develop-
ment. If subscribing to this claim, developing economies
should beneﬁt the most from diversity.
Yet, the debate is still open and no consensus on this issue
has so far been reached: Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001), for exam-
ple, reveal that at low levels of human capital the eﬀect of edu-
cation is actually negative whereas it is positive at middle
levels; they suggest that the negative eﬀect at low levels of
human capital may capture the tendency of additional
amounts of education being used for rent-seeking activities.
Although the net eﬀect is again ambiguous, there is ample the-
oretical and empirical ground to expect that countries at var-
ious points of the development spectrum do not display a
uniform response to increasing level of diversity. In the next
sections, we attempt to uncover diﬀerences in the substantive
impact of diversity on growth between developed market
economies and less developed countries. We ﬁrst however need
two compute indices of heterogeneity, using information on
migration stocks, the issue considered next.3. MEASURING DIVERSITY
Most empirical economic studies of diversity use the frac-
tionalization index, also known as ‘‘Ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization (ELF) Index”, which measures the likelihood that two
individuals randomly selected from the population belong to
diﬀerent ethnic groups. The index is a variation of the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) and can
be written as
Fractionalization ¼ 1
XN
i¼1
p2i ¼
XN
i¼1
pið1 piÞ
where pi is the proportion of citizens from country i,
4 and N is
the total number of countries in the world. Yet, while this
230 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmeasure of heterogeneity has attracted a fair amount of atten-
tion, it has also come under attack for its failure to capture the
multidimensional quality of ethnic identities and the sub-
national level variations (see Platteau, 2009). A number of
scholars have suggested that polarization, rather than frac-
tionalization, is a more appropriate index of diversity. In par-
ticular, as explained above, ethnolinguistic and religious
diversity can potentially have a strong conﬂict dimension.
Yet, whereas several authors have argued theoretically in
terms of polarization but used as an empirical proxy the index
of fractionalization, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a)
show how polarization is better suited to capture the concept
of social tensions. In particular, rent-seeking models point out
that social costs are higher and social tensions emerge more
easily when the population is distributed in two equally-sized
groups (i.e., it is highly polarized). For this reason, to capture
the potential for conﬂict in heterogeneous societies we add the
index of polarization to the traditional fractionalization index.
The index of polarization of Reynal-Querol (2002) takes the
following form
Polarization ¼ 4
XN
i¼1
p2i ð1 piÞ
The index is able to capture how far the distribution of the
groups is from a bipolar distribution where there are only two
groups of equal size. The polarization index is multiplied by 4
so as to make it range between 0 (maximum distance from a
bipolar distribution) and 1 (the population is concentrated
on two equally sized groups). While in the case of two groups,
the fractionalization and the polarization take up the same
value, when we move from two groups to three groups, the
relationship between those indices breaks down. This is
because in the fractionalization index, the group size does
not aﬀect the weight of the probabilities of two individuals
belonging to diﬀerent groups, whereas in the polarization
index these probabilities are in fact weighted by the relative
size of each group (see Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005b,
for a discussion).
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of fractionalization versus
polarization using our data source. For low levels of fraction-
alization, the correlation with polarization is positive, while
for intermediate levels of fractionalization, the correlation is
zero. For high levels of fractionalization, the correlation with
polarization becomes negative. Therefore, the correlation is
low when there is a high degree of heterogeneity. Generally
speaking, if the number of groups is larger than two, theFigure 1. Fractionalization versus Polarization.existence of many small groups increases fractionalization
but reduced polarization.4. DATA
This study covers the period during 1960–2010. Data on
migrant stocks—the number of people born in a country other
than that in which they live—are taken from the World Bank
for the 1960–2000 period, 5 and recently integrated throughout
2013. 6 The 1960–2000 dataset uses as a primary source of the
raw data the United Nations Population Division’s Global
Migration Database, created through the collaboration of
the United Nations Population Division, the United Nations
Statistics Division, the World Bank, and the University of Sus-
sex. The estimates are derived from over 1,100 national indi-
vidual census and population register records for more than
230 destination countries and territories over ﬁve decades.
Each census round was conducted during a 10-year window,
as most destination countries conducted their censuses at the
turn of the decade. 7 Ratha, Eigen-Zucchi, and Plaza (2016)
extend the UN Population Division (UNPD) dataset through-
out 2013 using data from new censuses and country sources
from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.
We refer the interested reader to Ratha and Shaw (2007) and
Ratha et al. (2016) for a thorough description of the method-
ology and a more comprehensive overview than we can possi-
bly give here. These studies also discuss the comparability of
migrants’ statistics and the caveats on the underlying bilateral
migration data, including the lack of standardized deﬁnitions
and common reporting standards. 8 O¨zden et al. (2011) oﬀer
an in-depth analysis of the data and show that migration from
the South (developing countries) to the North (developed
countries) increased from 14 million to 60 million during
1960–2000, mostly driven by movements to the US, Western
Europe, and the Persian Gulf. However, South-South migra-
tion remains the major share of total world migration,
although it is declining: in 1960, South-South migration
accounted for about 61% of the total migrant stock, while it
decreased to 48% by the year 2000.
We have a maximum of 135 countries, of which 27 are high-
income economies according to the deﬁnition of the World
Bank as of July 1, 2015 (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix
for more information). Information on per capita GDP (PPP
converted at 2005 constant prices) comes from the Penn World
Table (PWT), version 7.1.7. From the same dataset we also
take the population; the investment share of GDP, which is
a proxy for capital; the government consumption share of
GDP and the trade to GDP ratio, as the empirical growth lit-
erature suggests that government intervention and a country’s
openness to global economy and global trade have an impact
on output growth (see, for example, Durlauf & Quah, 1999).
To incorporate an indicator of human capital, we add the
average years of school attainment of the population aged
25 and over from Barro and Lee (2013). This is a fairly stan-
dard set of economic growth predictors (see e.g., Barro, 1991;
Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). We also include two dummy
variables taking on the value of one for Latin American and
Sub-Saharan countries, respectively. Finally, a recent work
by Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016) uncovers
a strong negative relation between ethnic inequality, measured
as the within-country diﬀerences in well-being across ethnic
groups, and per capita GDP. This very novel index of ethnic
inequality is constructed by combining ethnographic and lin-
guistic maps on the location of groups with satellite images
of light density at night. Interestingly, when they include both
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indicators in the empirical speciﬁcation, the latter loses signif-
icance. We therefore explore whether our indices of birthplace
fractionalization and polarization have independent and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on economic performances, after controlling
for inequality across ethnic lines. 9
We consider a global sample as well as two sub-samples,
made up of developing and developed economies, using the
classiﬁcation of the World Bank as of July 1, 2015. We express
the growth rates of per capita GDP and the diversity indices in
percentage points so as to facilitate the interpretation of the
coeﬃcients of diversity in the empirical analysis. We transform
all the other continuous variables into logs, except the growth
rate of population and the index of ethnic inequality, to scale
down the variance and reduce the eﬀect of outliers.
Table 1 contains the summary statistics of the full sample.
Fractionalization has an average value of 0.11 and a larger
standard deviation, 0.13. Polarization displays a mean and a
standard deviation of virtually the same size, 0.17 and 0.18
respectively, but larger than those of fractionalization. Finally,
while both indices have a minimum real value close to 0, when
a country is extremely homogeneous (e.g., Vietnam, China),
fractionalization has a maximum value of about 0.85 (e.g.,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) while polarization’s maximum value
is 0.76 (e.g., Israel, Saudi Arabia) as also shown in Figure 1.
In Table 2 we report the between and within standard devia-
tions. As we can see, the size of the within variation, although
less than half the size of the between variation, as one would
expect, is nonetheless critical and reﬂects within-country vari-
ations in ethnic, social, and religious composition over time.5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our baseline empirical model builds on a large literature
that uses country-level data and cross-country regressions to
explore the drivers of economic growth. We extend growth
models as in Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
(1992) by including a measure of diversity and estimate models
of the following form:
gi ¼ aþ cyi;t0 þ kDivi þ x0ibþ i ð3Þ
where gi is the annual percentage growth rate of the (PPP Con-
verted) per capita GDP at 2005 constant prices in country i
over a speciﬁc time interval (e.g., during 1960–2010) 10; Divi
is i’s annual percentage growth rate in its level of diversity,
measured by either fractionalization or polarization, over the
same period 11; xi is a vector of exogenous explanatoryTable 1. Summa
Variable Mean Std. D
Fractionalization 0.11 0.1
Polarization 0.17 0.1
Per capita GDP 8.29 1.2
Schooling 1.70 0.6
Investments (% GDP) 2.99 0.6
Openness (% GDP) 4.02 0.7
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 2.27 0.6
Population growth rate 1.83 1.2
Ethnic inequality 0.43 0.2
Latin American countries 0.18 0.3
Sub-Saharan countries 0.26 0.4
Developed countries 0.16 0.3variables that includes the level of income, investment share,
population growth rate, average years of schooling, govern-
ment consumption, trade openness, all measured in the initial
year of each sub-period; xi also includes the ethnic inequality
index of Alesina et al. (2016) and dummies for countries in
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa; a is a constant and
i is an error term. Our main coeﬃcient of interest is k, which
describes the relationship between changes in diversity and
economic development.
Our data on migration stocks are organized in 10-year inter-
vals from 1960 to 2010; therefore, to fully exploit this dataset,
we consider four diﬀerent time windows and estimate model
(3) over the intervals 1960–2010, 1970–2010, 1980–2010,
1990–2000, and 2000–10. This allows us to take into account
the changing nature of societies over time and to remove at
the same time short-term ﬂuctuations in the growth rate. We
control for heteroskedasticity by reporting robust standard
errors.
An important issue with model (3) is the likely endogeneity
of diversity and thereby the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimation of Eqn. (3) can be biased and inconsistent. Endo-
geneity can arise as results of causality running both ways,
e.g., countries that have higher growth rate might attract more
immigrants from a variety of origins, thereby increasing the
degree of diversity. Therefore, the heterogeneity of the popu-
lation can be the eﬀect rather than the cause of economic
growth. Likewise, diversity can be endogenous because it is
correlated with an omitted variable. 12 In this paper, we
address both issues by using two diﬀerent strategies. The ﬁrst
strategy builds on a recent work by Docquier, Lodigiani,
Rapoport, and Schiﬀ (2015) and exploits the dyadic nature
of our dataset on migration to run a gravity model and predict
countries’ bilateral migration stocks out of a set of exogenous
dyadic variables. We then use the bilateral predicted immigra-
tion stocks to construct indices of fractionalization and polar-
ization; ﬁnally, we use these gravity-based predicted diversity
indices as instruments for birthplace diversity (fractionaliza-
tion and polarization).
We pool data from 1960 to 2010 and estimate the following
gravity model of bilateral migration stocks:
log ðmÞij ¼ f if t þ f jf t þ f t þ x0ijbþ eij ð4Þ
where log ðmÞij is the logarithm of the total number of foreign
people living in country j and born in country i, fi ft is the
interaction between the country of origin ﬁxed eﬀect and year
dummies; fj ft is the interaction between the country of desti-
nation ﬁxed eﬀect and year dummies; ft is the time ﬁxed eﬀect;
xij is a vector of exogenous dyadic variables that includes somery statistics
ev. Min Max Obs
3 0.00 0.85 1061
8 0.00 0.76 1061
8 5.19 11.38 922
2 0.01 2.67 828
0 0.36 4.54 922
4 0.65 6.01 922
6 1.13 4.19 922
5 1.28 9.85 884
6 0.00 0.97 1007
8 0.00 1.00 1061
4 0.00 1.00 1061
7 0.00 1.00 1061
Table 2. Between and within standard deviation for fractionalization and
polarization index
Variable Overall Between Within
Fractionalization 0.13 0.12 0.05
Polarization 0.18 0.16 0.07
No. of countries 177
232 WORLD DEVELOPMENTclassical impediments or facilitating factors in a list of gravity
controls, in particular: a dummy for contiguous states; binary
variables taking value one if i and j are in a colonial relation-
ship, had the same colonizer, have a common language, or
were parts of the same country in the past; eij is the error term.
We also include the log of the country of origin’s population
and the capital-to-capital distance. 13 To increase the predic-
tive power of the gravity model, we follow Docquier et al.
(2015) and include interactions between geographic distance
and time dummies. These additional controls introduce time
variation in model (4) so that identiﬁcation comes also from
time-varying factors. Moreover, these interactions are meant
to capture changes in transportation and communication
costs, which are likely to aﬀect decisions to move from one
country to another. The estimated gravity model allows us
to construct predicted diversity indices, which are used as
instruments for fractionalization and polarization in the
cross-country regressions. Predictions of bilateral migration
are calculated by means of a log-linear model and OLS estima-
tor as in Frankel and Romer (1999). To deal with the presence
of zero observations (when same pairs of countries do not
have bilateral migration ﬂows) we transform the dependent
variable by adding 1. To avoid the bias of a log-
transformation and check the robustness of our results, we
also use the pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood estimator
(PPML) suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 14
In a prominent paper, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) argue
that this predicted instrument could act as a proxy for geogra-
phy’s direct eﬀect on growth and that omitting other channels
through which geography aﬀects growth may invalidate the
exclusion restrictions. To exclude the possibility that our
results are not spurious and are not arising from correlations
of our indices with omitted factors, we extend the vector of
controls in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) models by
including the following variables: area in km2, altitude, mean
distance to coast, mean distance to river, percentage of land
area in the Tropics, an indicator for irrigation condition and
a measure for soil quality. Results from these additional mod-
els are reported in Tables A2–A3 in the Online Appendix. 15
Another potential concern is the inclusion of country of des-
tination ﬁxed eﬀects in model (4). Ortega and Peri (2014)
argues that, by absorbing all the country-speciﬁc factors that
account for bilateral ﬂows, the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects may
re-introduce endogeneity when e.g., they are correlated with
the expected income levels in the target country. One solution
would be the exclusion of country of destination ﬁxed eﬀects
from the gravity model. However, although the resulting pre-
dictors could be more credibly exogenous, the goodness of ﬁt
of the model is greatly deteriorated, and so is its ability to pre-
dict the migration stocks in the data. 16 A much poorer model
ﬁt inevitably leads to weak instruments. In fact, as one would
expect, we ﬁnd that in all model speciﬁcations the predicted
diversity indices are only weakly correlated to the endogenous
variables. Moreover, critical values for ﬁrst-stage F-stat are
never above conventional levels characterizing weak instru-
ments. Eventually, we chose the model that controls for coun-
try dummies, as it explains more accurately global bilateral
migration data and thus provides more robust instruments.To further address the issue of omitted variable bias, our
second strategy consists in estimating a dynamic panel data
model a` la Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998). This model removes country-speciﬁc unobserved
factors that might drive the relationship between diversity and
economic growth and takes additionally into account the
potential endogeneity of the other explanatory variables. We
use both internal instruments (that is, all available lags) as well
as changes in the predicted values of fractionalization and
polarization as instruments for the actual changes in these
indices. 17 We estimate this model using our 10-year interval
data and all our explanatory variables—with the exception
of fractionalization and polarization—are lagged one period
(10 years). We do not include the ethnic inequality index in
this speciﬁcation, as it is time invariant. We use the two-step
procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and obtain
robust standard errors using the Windmeijer’s (2005) ﬁnite
sample correction.6. RESULTS
Our ﬁrst round of results, obtained when we estimate a
naı¨ve OLS model, is reported in Table 3. We consider diﬀerent
time intervals in each column and split Table 3 into two parts,
Panel A which shows the impact of Fractionalization and
Panel B the impact of Polarization. 18
Before discussing our main explanatory variables, we brieﬂy
comment on the results with regard to the control variables.
Overall, the control variables add signiﬁcantly to the ﬁt of
the model and their signs are aligned with the mainstream
studies on the determinants of growth (see e.g., Barro, 1991;
Mankiw et al., 1992). For example, whereas the average years
of schooling and the rate of investment have a positive associ-
ation with growth, initial income is negative as expected. This
is the result of the so-called ‘‘conditional convergence”, i.e.,
poorer economies’ per capita incomes growth at a faster rate
than richer economies. Some of the control variables fail to
achieve signiﬁcance at conventional levels when we look at
the shortest time intervals (e.g., 2000–10), thus suggesting that
initial endowment of production factors mostly aﬀects the
medium and long-run rate of economic growth. Finally note
that ethnic inequality, the economic diﬀerences between ethnic
groups coexisting in the same country, is indeed negative and
signiﬁcant as Alesina et al. (2016) point out.
Table 3 contains our baseline growth regressions for the per-
iod 1960–2010. As it is made clear, diversity measured by
either fractionalization or polarization is consistently positive
and signiﬁcant at conventional level. We obtain parameter
estimates of similar magnitude and same signiﬁcance for the
periods 1970–2010, 1980–2010, and 1990–2010. The only nota-
ble exception is the last decade, 2000–10, where fractionaliza-
tion and polarization are both negative, but only the latter is
statistically diﬀerent from zero, albeit only weakly.
The coeﬃcients allow for a direct reading and imply that,
for example, during 1960–2010, the growth rate of the per cap-
ita GDP increases by about 0.15 percentage points when the
growth rate of fractionalization variable increases by one unit
(i.e., one percentage point, approximately the increase experi-
enced by Haiti). Similarly, one percentage point increase in the
growth rate of polarization (similar to the change occurred in
Djibouti during the period 1960–2010) is correlated with an
increase of the per capita GDP of about 0.15 percentage
points. Yet, one may be concerned with the potential unmea-
sured heterogeneity between countries and the likely presence
of reverse causality. The economic conditions in the potential
Table 3. Growth and diversity—OLS results
60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10
Panel A
Fractionalization 0.148*** 0.113*** 0.131*** 0.061* 0.040
(0.046) (0.042) (0.039) (0.033) (0.024)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.127*** 0.957*** 0.968*** 0.677*** 1.208***
(0.171) (0.139) (0.156) (0.203) (0.197)
Population growth rate 0.374** 0.195 0.275* 0.287* 0.515**
(0.181) (0.150) (0.152) (0.159) (0.221)
Investments (% GDP) 0.551*** 0.385* 0.132 0.511 0.598
(0.152) (0.230) (0.277) (0.309) (0.436)
Schooling 0.882*** 0.938*** 1.038*** 0.495 0.824
(0.291) (0.285) (0.374) (0.521) (0.638)
Openness (% GDP) 0.182 0.147 0.029 0.044 0.231
(0.154) (0.157) (0.203) (0.244) (0.427)
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 0.122 0.082 0.116 0.289 0.067
(0.125) (0.192) (0.222) (0.322) (0.428)
Ethnic inequality 0.969* 0.863 1.057* 0.000*** 1.024
(0.546) (0.587) (0.624) (0.000) (0.821)
Observations 95 118 118 127 135
R2 0.607 0.505 0.456 0.307 0.369
Panel B
Polarization 0.152*** 0.113** 0.132*** 0.062* 0.042*
(0.047) (0.043) (0.040) (0.033) (0.025)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.114*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.664*** 1.220***
(0.171) (0.138) (0.156) (0.203) (0.196)
Population growth rate 0.389** 0.190 0.266* 0.278* 0.523**
(0.176) (0.149) (0.150) (0.159) (0.218)
Investments (% GDP) 0.548*** 0.382 0.124 0.510 0.599
(0.153) (0.230) (0.276) (0.309) (0.435)
Schooling 0.867*** 0.933*** 1.036*** 0.494 0.831
(0.291) (0.286) (0.374) (0.521) (0.637)
Openness (% GDP) 0.191 0.153 0.039 0.041 0.238
(0.155) (0.158) (0.204) (0.244) (0.426)
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 0.120 0.074 0.106 0.285 0.071
(0.124) (0.192) (0.221) (0.321) (0.427)
Ethnic inequality 0.944* 0.862 1.053* 0.000*** 1.024
(0.547) (0.588) (0.624) (0.000) (0.819)
Observations 95 118 118 127 135
R2 0.606 0.503 0.455 0.306 0.370
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Huber–White robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries and a
constant are included but not shown.
MIGRATION, DIVERSITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 233country of destination, as well as its immigration policies,
could be important drivers of immigration and if unaccounted
for, they could bias our results and lead to incorrect infer-
ences. In Table 4 we therefore examine whether the estimated
eﬀects of diversity are robust to an instrumental variable
approach, where the instrument builds on a gravity model of
migration, as described in Eqn. (4).
Despite the fundamentally diﬀerent procedure, the sign of
the coeﬃcients is unchanged and remains largely supportive
of our previous results. Both fractionalization and polariza-
tion now retain a positive sign and the substantive eﬀect of
diversity overall is now bigger: on average a one-point increase
in the degree of fractionalization (polarization) is predicted to
increase the per capita GDP by about 0.25 (0.26) percentage
points on average. The other contextual covariates behave lar-
gely as in Table 3. Note however that diversity is signiﬁcant at
conventional levels only over long time intervals. In fact, dur-
ing 1990–2010 as well as during 2000–10, both indices,although consistently positive, are insigniﬁcant. This result
may also stem from the nature of the speciﬁc subsamples
under examination, i.e., diversity may have not been aﬀecting
economic growth when we restrict the sample to the two most
recent decades. Note also that the results in the last two col-
umns are subject to an important caveat: the values of the
F-stat are all below conventional levels characterizing weak
instruments. As such, these results must be interpreted with
caution.
Tables 5 and 6 present analogous estimates of Table 4 but
distinguish between developing (Table 5) and developed
(Table 6) countries. Results for developing countries in Table 5
are largely consistent with those in Table 4, and both fraction-
alization and polarization seem to matter for economic growth
over long time intervals. The size of both indices is now larger,
and a shift of one percentage point in the level of diversity
produces, on average, an increase in per capita income of
about 0.3 percentage points. However, when we turn to the
Table 4. Growth and diversity—2SLS results
60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10
Panel A
Fractionalization 0.209** 0.270*** 0.273*** 0.123 0.025
(0.082) (0.089) (0.095) (0.168) (0.153)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.206*** 1.100*** 1.028*** 0.686*** 1.268***
(0.170) (0.158) (0.161) (0.195) (0.218)
Population growth rate 0.382** 0.141 0.242 0.281* 0.596**
(0.194) (0.185) (0.173) (0.165) (0.240)
Investments (% GDP) 0.547*** 0.363* 0.100 0.445 0.481
(0.145) (0.217) (0.266) (0.307) (0.479)
Schooling 0.915*** 0.977*** 0.991** 0.420 0.625
(0.280) (0.314) (0.397) (0.561) (0.795)
Openness (% GDP) 0.222 0.131 0.018 0.040 0.168
(0.140) (0.143) (0.203) (0.230) (0.389)
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 0.132 0.046 0.122 0.316 0.070
(0.115) (0.191) (0.222) (0.318) (0.402)
Ethnic inequality 0.887 0.850 1.123* 0.000*** 0.798
(0.546) (0.611) (0.643) (0.000) (0.878)
Observations 95 118 118 127 135
R2 0.595 0.422 0.372 0.283 0.335
First stage F-stat 45 49 13 4 3
Panel B
Polarization 0.221** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.126 0.027
(0.086) (0.092) (0.097) (0.170) (0.156)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.195*** 1.066*** 0.983*** 0.659*** 1.261***
(0.168) (0.156) (0.161) (0.195) (0.197)
Population growth rate 0.404** 0.127 0.221 0.263 0.592***
(0.188) (0.185) (0.172) (0.174) (0.227)
Investments (% GDP) 0.543*** 0.353 0.081 0.443 0.480
(0.147) (0.219) (0.266) (0.308) (0.478)
Schooling 0.897*** 0.966*** 0.986** 0.415 0.619
(0.280) (0.317) (0.398) (0.560) (0.804)
Openness (% GDP) 0.238* 0.145 0.038 0.034 0.163
(0.141) (0.144) (0.207) (0.230) (0.389)
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 0.129 0.023 0.101 0.309 0.067
(0.114) (0.193) (0.220) (0.314) (0.405)
Ethnic inequality 0.844 0.847 1.117* 0.000*** 0.796
(0.553) (0.616) (0.647) (0.000) (0.874)
Observations 95 118 118 127 135
R2 0.592 0.412 0.366 0.282 0.333
First stage F-stat 44 49 25 4 3
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Huber–White robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries and a
constant are included but not shown.
234 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdeveloped economies, in Table 6, both indices are indiscernible
from zero, with the exception of the last decade, 2000–10,
where they are negative and signiﬁcant. Overall, it appears
that developing countries are those beneﬁting from diversity,
perhaps because they are more distant from the technological
frontier (see e.g., Vandenbussche et al., 2006). Yet, the results
in Tables 5 and 6 must also be viewed with caution because
most of the models are run on small samples and have low
ﬁrst-stage F-stat, in particular the models estimated over short
time periods. 19
To delve deeper into the heterogeneous eﬀects of diversity
on growth, Table 7 reports dynamic panel data estimators,
which should further address endogeneity concerns and at
them same time it is based on larger samples. 20 The results
suggest that diversity increases the level of per capita income
in the full sample, as well as in the sample of developing
countries. In fact, in the sample of more advanced econo-mies, we cannot reject the null of no impact of diversity in
the GDP. If anything, this corroborates our previous ﬁndings
on the diﬀerent eﬀect of diversity on growth, according to the
level of development. The coeﬃcients are considerably smal-
ler, about one third of those in Tables 5 and 6, but this is
unsurprising as this last model, by introducing a battery of
instruments to reduce the omitted variable bias, is expected
to produce very conservative estimates. As we can see, an
increase of one percentage point in the degree of fractional-
ization (polarization) increases the per capita output by a
minimum of 0.087 (0.095) percentage points in the full sam-
ple to a maximum of 0.095 (0.096) percentage points in the
sample of developing economies. Once again, the signs of
the coeﬃcients consistently point out to a similar eﬀect of
fractionalization and polarization on economic growth. This
result stands in sharp contrast to previous studies by e.g.,
Alesina et al. (2003) and Ager and Bru¨ckner (2013), which
Table 5. Growth and diversity—2SLS results, developing countries
60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10 60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10
Fractionalization 0.277*** 0.340*** 0.335*** 0.248 0.092
(0.093) (0.101) (0.108) (0.188) (0.242)
Polarization 0.288*** 0.352*** 0.345*** 0.255 0.097
(0.097) (0.104) (0.111) (0.195) (0.258)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.181*** 1.150*** 1.026*** 0.736*** 1.230** 1.179*** 1.141*** 1.005*** 0.718*** 1.225**
(0.228) (0.263) (0.255) (0.264) (0.541) (0.232) (0.268) (0.258) (0.264) (0.538)
Population growth 0.639** 0.245 0.296 0.439* 1.083* 0.642** 0.239 0.286 0.421* 1.081*
(0.267) (0.279) (0.251) (0.246) (0.564) (0.265) (0.276) (0.251) (0.245) (0.567)
Investments (% GDP) 0.445*** 0.369 0.038 0.406 0.429 0.452*** 0.375 0.043 0.412 0.435
(0.148) (0.275) (0.350) (0.328) (0.569) (0.150) (0.276) (0.352) (0.329) (0.565)
Schooling 0.894** 0.932** 0.887* 0.014 0.332 0.886** 0.927** 0.880* 0.023 0.328
(0.353) (0.403) (0.500) (0.769) (1.213) (0.357) (0.405) (0.504) (0.766) (1.233)
Openness (% GDP) 0.260 0.043 0.100 0.298 0.761 0.266 0.048 0.091 0.291 0.750
(0.168) (0.164) (0.240) (0.287) (0.564) (0.168) (0.165) (0.243) (0.289) (0.577)
Gov’t consumption 0.133 0.088 0.012 0.327 0.015 0.133 0.092 0.013 0.328 0.013
(0.129) (0.228) (0.257) (0.336) (0.451) (0.129) (0.230) (0.259) (0.336) (0.454)
Ethnic inequality 0.235 0.638 0.915 0.359 1.521 0.215 0.634 0.913 0.364 1.504
(0.691) (0.844) (0.849) (0.813) (0.947) (0.695) (0.852) (0.856) (0.818) (0.974)
Observations 73 93 93 100 108 73 93 93 100 108
First stage F-stat 35 19 9 4 1 34 19 17 4 1
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Huber–White robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries and a
constant are included but not shown.
Table 6. Growth and diversity—2SLS results, developed countries
60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10 60–10 70–10 80–10 90–10 00–10
Fractionalization 0.034 0.042 0.086 0.137 0.428**
(0.090) (0.089) (0.151) (0.181) (0.190)
Polarization 0.035 0.042 0.087 0.133 0.400***
(0.092) (0.088) (0.152) (0.176) (0.146)
Per capita GDP, t0 1.613*** 1.787*** 1.663** 1.893*** 0.717 1.595*** 1.779*** 1.617** 1.883*** 0.331
(0.286) (0.592) (0.691) (0.618) (0.963) (0.299) (0.607) (0.674) (0.651) (0.833)
Population growth 0.086 0.247 0.436 0.547** 0.303 0.080 0.247 0.439 0.581** 0.344*
(0.173) (0.180) (0.276) (0.260) (0.248) (0.174) (0.184) (0.271) (0.280) (0.204)
Investments (% GDP) 0.224 0.397 0.758* 1.393** 2.766** 0.218 0.391 0.802** 1.569** 2.654**
(0.369) (0.334) (0.387) (0.660) (1.335) (0.369) (0.339) (0.396) (0.706) (1.167)
Schooling 0.281 0.090 0.227 0.006 4.097* 0.293 0.088 0.265 0.215 1.904
(0.474) (0.350) (0.844) (1.260) (2.350) (0.464) (0.350) (0.870) (1.031) (1.554)
Openness (% GDP) 0.407*** 0.514*** 0.482 0.948*** 0.367 0.410*** 0.522*** 0.444 0.916*** 0.234
(0.118) (0.175) (0.345) (0.342) (0.369) (0.122) (0.177) (0.328) (0.349) (0.351)
Gov’t consumption 0.241 0.712 0.986 0.672 0.658 0.228 0.682 1.095 0.879 0.056
(0.262) (0.469) (0.821) (0.691) (1.064) (0.251) (0.457) (0.747) (0.542) (0.686)
Ethnic inequality 0.355 0.149 0.465 0.260 2.991*** 0.351 0.157 0.437 0.467 1.529
(0.565) (0.593) (0.665) (0.834) (1.107) (0.580) (0.596) (0.628) (0.718) (1.152)
Observations 22 25 25 26 27 22 25 25 26 27
First stage F-stat 5 10 6 2 3 6 10 6 3 5
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Huber–White robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries and a
constant are included but not shown.
MIGRATION, DIVERSITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 235found that fractionalization and polarization have an oppo-
site impact on output growth.7. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we explore whether diversity brought about
by immigration aﬀects economic development. This issue lies
at the intersection of two separate yet intertwined strands of
research: one on diversity and the other on migration. The
issue of migration is rising quickly up the global agendaand features prominently in the academic literature, where
a remarkable consensus has emerged around the beneﬁcial
impact of immigration on the economic development of
the host country. At the same time the literature on diver-
sity has so far found diﬃcult to convincingly establish the
very direction of the eﬀect of cultural heterogeneity on eco-
nomic growth (that is whether it is positive or negative). It
is also unclear to what extent fractionalization and polariza-
tion diﬀer in their eﬀects on output growth and which index
is more relevant as a determinant of economic outcomes.
Perhaps more importantly, however, existing contributions
Table 7. Growth and diversity—dynamic panel results
All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Fractionalization 0.087** 0.095** 0.104
(0.043) (0.042) (0.146)
Polarization 0.089** 0.096** 0.119
(0.043) (0.043) (0.150)
Per capita GDP 0.127 0.144 0.431 0.443 4.577** 4.597**
(0.514) (0.510) (0.640) (0.641) (2.186) (2.054)
Investments (% GDP) 2.011*** 2.018*** 1.931*** 1.921*** 0.178 0.340
(0.502) (0.506) (0.596) (0.600) (1.592) (1.130)
Schooling 0.987 1.008 1.777* 1.787* 0.455 0.131
(0.881) (0.878) (0.953) (0.957) (2.592) (2.663)
Population growth rate 0.253 0.248 0.447 0.456 0.465 0.591
(0.392) (0.391) (0.423) (0.425) (0.982) (0.857)
Openness (% GDP) 0.521 0.504 0.376 0.356 0.483 0.566
(0.698) (0.692) (0.754) (0.757) (1.001) (0.849)
Gov’t consumption (% GDP) 2.154*** 2.171*** 1.791* 1.793* 0.368 0.202
(0.783) (0.784) (0.959) (0.962) (1.627) (2.042)
Observations 466 466 367 367 99 99
Countries 130 130 103 103 27 27
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.551 0.520
AR(2) p-value 0.859 0.872 0.568 0.557 0.603 0.581
Hansen test p-value 0.622 0.620 0.462 0.451 0.261 0.326
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Windmeijer’s (2005) standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are based on 10-year growth spells and are
estimated using System GMM with all available lags used as instruments as well as (changes in) predicted index of fractionalization (polarization) as
instrument for the actual (changes in) index of fractionalization (polarization). All variables except fractionalization and polarization indices are lagged
one period (10 years).
236 WORLD DEVELOPMENThave assumed that diversity exerts the same eﬀect on eco-
nomic growth both over time and across countries and, to
date, there has been no systematic attempt to explore
whether diversity has idiosyncratic eﬀects on economic
growth.
Against this background, ﬁrst, we use a new dataset on
migrant stocks, based on population censuses, which gives
us the opportunity to compute time-varying measures of frac-
tionalization and polarization during 1960–2010. Second, we
compare and contrast developing and developed economies
to investigate whether there are systematic diﬀerences between
them. We employ an array of econometric models over ﬁve
sub-periods, including a novel instrumental variable approach,
to account for the likely omission of important co-
determinants of growth and diversity and mitigate concerns
of reverse causality.
We ﬁnd that our indices of cultural heterogeneity, birthplace
fractionalization, and polarization, have a positive impact on
the growth rate of the GDP over large time periods, and that
they coeﬃcients are of similar magnitude. By splitting coun-
tries into two subgroups according to their initial level of
per capita income, our results reveal that developing econo-
mies seem to be more likely to experience an increase in the
GDP growth rate following changes in the degree of diversity.
Although this ﬁnding challenges the assumption of a homoge-
nous eﬀect of diversity on growth, on which the majority of
the cross-country empirical literature on diversity is based, it
is subject to some caveats, in particular the quality of the ﬁrst
stage regression in the models run over the shortest time peri-
ods. Overall, the results of our most conservative model—i.e.,
panel data model—suggest that one percentage point increase
in the growth rate of fractionalization (polarization) boosts
the per capita output by about 0.1 percentage point in the
developing countries.In the words of Alesina et al. (2003, p. 182): ‘‘The question
of what makes diﬀerent countries more or less successful eco-
nomically and what explains the quality of their policies is one
of the most fascinating that economists can ask, but it is also
one of the most diﬃcult to answer.”We hope that our research
could make a contribution to successfully addressing this dif-
ﬁcult question. Whereas we provide new important insights
into the eﬀect of cultural heterogeneity on economic
growth—and our evidence seems to suggest that
immigration-fueled diversity is generally good for economic
growth—more needs to be done to fully uncover the eﬀect
of diversity on development. Firstly, diversity is a phe-
nomenon continually in motion and diﬃcult to conceptualize.
Individuals have many observable characteristics—race, lan-
guage, religion, nationality, wealth, education-but only some
categories have economic salience. Indices based on the ethnic-
ity, religion, or language identity of sub-populations within
each country could be too narrow, whereas these identities
are usually given at birth, as Horowitz (1985) suggests. If we
subscribe to Horowitz’s (1985) claim that the ascription to
birth is one of the most coherent marker of diversity, future
studies should treat migration and diversity as two phenomena
belonging to the same line of inquiry. Secondly, although we
extend earlier research on diversity by constructing more
informative measures of birthplace heterogeneity, future
research should focus on the characteristics of the migrants
(e.g., age, education), which can give a more systematic and
accurate snapshot of diversity patterns. Thirdly, the theory
on diversity and team performance relies on micro-level argu-
ments that focus on individual behavior. To dig deeper into
the relationship between diversity and growth, more eﬀort
should be devoted to the integration of macro data with
individual-level information on cultural and social characteris-
tics.
MIGRATION, DIVERSITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 237NOTES1. Alesina et al. (2003), for example, compute linguistic fractionalization
using data from the Encyclopedia Britannica, which reports the shares of
languages spoken as mother tongues, usually based on national census.
Data on ethnic fractionalization were also computed using as a primary
source the Encyclopedia Britannica, integrated with data from other
sources such as the CIA World Factbook. Subsequent studies build on the
same data.
2. Some key points distinguish our empirical eﬀorts from theirs: (i) we
provide the ﬁrst systematic analysis of the diﬀerences in the impact of
diversity on growth between developing and developed countries; (ii) we
address the issue of omitted variable bias using a battery of gravity-based
instrumental variables and extend the analysis to the 2000–10 decade; and
(iii) we compute indices of population diversity and distinguish between
fractionalization and polarization, which has been found to be crucial
‘‘when examining the eﬀects that cultural diversity has on economic
growth” (Ager & Bru¨ckner, 2013, p. 96), in particular in light of the
important debate on how to capture eﬀectively the degree of diversity
within a country (see e.g., Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005a; Platteau,
2009). The eﬀect of them all taken together leads to substantially diﬀerent
implications.
3. In a very recent contribution, however, Gisselquist, Leiderer, and
Nin˜o-Zarazu´a (2016) challenge the ‘‘conventional wisdom” maintaining a
negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods
provision and ﬁnd that the relation is actually positive, in particular with
key welfare outcomes.
4. This ﬁrst measure of diversity, i.e., birthplace diversity, builds directly
on the one used by Ottaviano and Peri (2006). As such, pi also includes the
natives.
5. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-
database.
6. Two matrixes are available for the post-2000 decade and we use the
most recent one as it covers a wider number of countries. See http://
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/
migration-remittances-data.
7. Alesina et al. (2016) use also information on whether migrants have a
college education. A richer dataset does exist but only captures the
structure of migration to OECD destinations. See also Artuc¸, Docquier,
O¨zden, and Parsons (2015) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for a
discussion on more reﬁned brain drain indicators, including the estimates
of gross and net human capital levels across the world.
8. To exclude the possibility that the relationship between diversity and
economic growth is driven by the inclusion of the 2010 wave, we estimate
models without 2010. The results are shown in Tables A7–A10 in the
Online Appendix. Coeﬃcients are slightly smaller but qualitatively
consistent with the baseline results.9. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this
variable.
10. The average of the annual growth rates is often used. This is a
reasonable approximation to the compound growth rate, the one we use in
this paper, for low rates but loses accuracy as the growth rate rises.
However, in our data set the two measures show a very high correlation of
0.9.
11. We apply a 1% winsorization to the annual percentage growth rate of
fractionalization and polarization so as to reduce the eﬀect of extreme
values.
12. Islam (1995), for example, shows that the production function
actually diﬀers across countries and is correlated with the included
explanatory variables, thus creating omitted variable bias.
13. Due to space limitations, the results of the gravity model of bilateral
stocks are not presented here, but are available upon request from the
authors.
14. Results from the two-stage least squares models when we use
predicted diversity indices calculated from PPML as instruments are
shown in Tables A4–A6 in the Online Appendix.
15. Note that given the small number of degrees of freedom, we cannot
provide the same estimates for the sample of developed economies.
16. In fact, we ﬁnd that the adjusted R-squared of the gravity model
without country of destination dummies is 0.33 while the value for the
model which includes country dummies is 0.66. Likewise, we detect a 33%
increase in the Root MSE between the two models.
17. For studies using panel data model, see Islam (1995). For recent
applications of dynamic panel data model see Arcand, Berkes, and
Panizza (2015) and Beck and Levine (2004).
18. The correlation between fractionalization and polarization is 0.9,
which suggests near multicollinearity. In fact, when we include both
indices jointly in the regression, the estimators have very large variance
and the conﬁdence intervals are much wider, making precise estimation
diﬃcult. For this reason, we use each index separately.
19. Note also that the values of the F statistics in the last decade across
the developed countries make the negative sign of diversity unreliable.
20. At the bottom of Table 6 we report the standard speciﬁcation tests
and show that most regressions reject the null of no ﬁrst order
autocorrelation, and that all models do not reject the null of no second
order autocorrelation. The Hansen tests of the over-identifying restrictions
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